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THE PRINCIPAL’S THEORY OF MIND: 
THE ROLE OF MENTALIZING FOR REWARD DESIGN AND  
MANAGEMENT IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONS 
 
 
Abstract  
Agency theory is one of the most important foundational theories in management 
research, but it rests on tenuous cognitive assumptions. We combine classical agency 
theory with a realistic theory of the intrinsically imperfect human potential for 
interpersonal sensemaking. This allows us to systematically show how the principal’s 
ability to mentalize with the agent influences value creation in principal-agent relations, 
and to link this to organizational sensemaking instruments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory (Gibbons, 2005; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Holmström, 1979; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Prendergast, 1999) is one of the most important foundational 
theories in management research (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendry, 2002). Agency theory has found 
numerous applications in various streams of management research (Merchant, Van der Stede and 
Zheng, 2003), such as incentive management (Stroh, Brett, Baumann and Reilly, 1996), accounting 
(Antle and Demski, 1988; Lambert, 2001), organization theory (Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Zenger, 
1994), and corporate governance and strategy (Amihud and Lev, 1999; Brush, Bromiley and 
Hendrickx, 2000; Coff, 1997). The theory provides fundamental insight into the roles of contracting, 
monitoring, organizational arrangements, and the incentives embodied therein. 
 Agency theory and its many applications are based on several simplifying assumptions 
(Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very, 2006). In this paper, we specifically focus on the assumptions 
regarding the knowledge that individuals have of each other and how they process that knowledge. In 
order to precisely identify and discuss these issues, we take our point of departure in the core, 
typically mathematical, statements of the theory (e.g., Holmström, 1979, 1982; Grossman and Hart, 
1983; Laffont and Martimort, 2002) rather than in interpretations of agency theory found in the 
management literature (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989).
1
 The theory’s formal core statements highlight the 
clear, albeit strong and contentious, nature of knowledge and rationality assumptions in agency 
theory. For example, in analyses of moral hazard, the principal is assumed to perfectly know the 
agent’s taste for risk (Ross, 1973; Holmström, 1979). The source of such knowledge is the principal’s 
ability to understand key characteristics of what is in the agent’s mind. When principals engage in 
such understanding, they “mentalize” (Singer and Fehr, 2005).  
 To theoretically approach and build up the mentalizing construct, we draw on new, converging 
insights from evolutionary anthropology (Call and Tomasello, 2008), neuroscience (Gallagher and 
Frith, 2003), neuro-economics (Singer and Fehr, 2005), and research on perspective-taking in 
                                                          
1
 Eisenhardt (1989) makes a distinction between formal, mathematical agency theory (“principal-agent 
research”) and a more applied, verbal version of the theory (“positivist agency theory”). However, formal 
agency theory is just as “positive” (in a theory of science sense) as “positivist agency theory” and both have 
normative implications. The distinction is not found in contemporary agency theory.  
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psychology (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin and White, 2008). In line with this research, we define 
mentalizing as one individual’s understanding of another individual’s intentions, knowledge, and 
beliefs. The relevancy of the mentalizing concept has been evidenced in both theoretical and empirical 
research. Such research indicates that mentalizing is a meaningful construct that it is usually 
imperfect, that—absent specific neurological pathologies—it varies on a continuous scale that ranges 
from inaccurate to (imperfectly) accurate, and that it is asymmetrically distributed across individuals. 
It also suggests that mentalizing processes can be deliberate or non-deliberate (i.e., automatic), and 
that they can be influenced by context and experience. Our unique and specific contributions consist 
of the introduction of this construct (the general human capacity to mentalize) into the context of 
agency theory, and an exploration of the value-creating implications of doing so.  
 In agency theory, the principal’s knowledge with respect to much (but not all) of what is 
“inside the head” of the agent is assumed to be perfect. Coupled with other assumptions (such as those 
regarding risk preferences and the timing of the game), this assumption allows for clean predictions 
regarding how incentives will drive the behavior of such actors as employees, managers, and suppliers 
(Prendergast, 1999). However, the assumption that a principal is capable of perfectly grasping, for 
example, an agent’s motivations seems increasingly tenuous. High personnel turnover and the 
increasing use of fleeting project organization in many industries, as well as the increasing prevalence 
of cross-national and cross-cultural management teams and networks, make an assumption of 
imperfect mentalizing on the part of the principal a more adequate analytical starting point.  
 We examine the consequences of introducing more realistic assumptions about mentalizing for 
agency theory and its management applications. On the one hand, we posit that mentalizing is 
imperfect and that, as a result, real-world principals cannot perfectly mentalize in the manner assumed 
by agency theory. On the other hand, we assert that mentalizing provides access to “soft psychological 
information” that is not considered in agency theory. This information provides cues to the agent’s 
type or effort. We show that novel insights into the design and management of rewards follow from 
this information. Specifically, we argue that mentalizing is a fundamental and cost-efficient 
instrument for reducing information asymmetry and raising value creation in the principal-agent 
setting.  
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 The evidence suggests that incentives are often far from perfectly matched with the agents 
whose behavior they are meant to regulate, sometimes with detrimental consequences (Baker, 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; O’Connor, Priem, Coombs and Gilley, 2006; Zahra, Priem and Rasheed, 
2005). One example was Dun and Bradstreet’s practice of only paying bonuses to salespersons when 
customers bought a larger subscription to the firm’s credit report services than they had purchased in 
the preceding year. This practice led to huge lawsuits based on claims that Dun and Bradstreet 
salespersons had fraudulently misrepresented the usage of subscriptions to lure customers into buying 
larger subscriptions (Roberts, 1989). One possible cause may have been imperfect mentalizing: 
principals may not have envisioned that their agents would react in creative, yet clearly dysfunctional, 
ways to the incentives. In other words, they did not grasp the intentions that the distortionary 
incentives might give rise to. As the example suggests, the principal’s mentalizing matters because it 
influences the incentives he offers to the agent, and how he monitors the agent and otherwise manages 
the relationship. In turn, such “incentive management” (Holmström, 1979, 1999) influences the value 
that principal and agent jointly create.  
 In order to understand this issue, we must raise and answer the following research questions: 
How do the design and management of incentives depend on the principal’s mentalizing? How does 
this relation differ from the predictions of agency theory? We seek to answer these questions by 
developing the construct of mentalizing in the context of the agency relation. We thus contribute to 
the understanding of the cognitive micro-foundations of value creation (see Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2001).  
Most extant critical discussions of agency theory in economics, and in management and 
organization research have centered on the motivational assumptions of the theory (Fehr and Falk, 
2002; Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2005; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Osterloh 
and Frey, 2000; Perrow, 1986). However, very few papers have explicitly dealt with knowledge and 
rationality assumptions. Papers written by Hendry (2002, 2005) are closest to this paper in terms of 
concerns regarding the assumptions of agency theory. Hendry’s papers significantly extend standard 
agency theory by demonstrating that most of the theory’s predictions rely on the structural properties 
of principal-agent relationships rather than classical assumptions about opportunistic self-seeking 
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behavior and total competence. However, our focus differs. Hendry relaxes key assumptions of 
agency theory and then shows that, with only one exception, the predictions produced by the standard 
theory remain the same. Although we also relax assumptions, we generate new predictions about 
principal-agent relations by placing principal-agent relations with imperfectly mentalizing principals 
in a broader organizational setting.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we clarify the implicit theory of 
mind in agency theory, namely that the principal possesses a perfect mentalizing capability in certain 
key respects, but in other, equally key, respects, the principal possesses little or no mentalizing 
capability. Second, we develop a more realistic conception of mentalizing capability. Third, we use 
this conception to develop propositions about how mentalizing capability can increase value creation. 
Fourth, we contextualize our reasoning in an organizational setting and discuss how the value-creation 
consequences of mentalizing are influenced by governance mechanisms. We close with a discussion 
of the implications and limitations of our analysis, and we draw up an agenda for future research on 
these themes.  
KNOWLEDGE ASSUMPTIONS IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY  
The Principal-Agent Setting and the Principal’s Problem 
 Agency theory is based on a combination of assumptions regarding what individuals know, 
how they cognitively process what they know, and how they are motivated in the context of agency 
settings—that is, when one of (for simplicity) two individuals assumes the role of principal and 
delegates a task to the other individual, the agent. Specifically, agency models are mathematical 
representations of the situation in which an informed individual (typically the agent) trades with an 
uninformed individual (typically the principal) (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). The issue that the 
individuals are informed/uninformed about concerns what the agent does (“hidden actions,” 
motivating models of “moral hazard”) or what “type” he is (“hidden characteristics,” motivating 
models of “adverse selection”).  
The principal’s problem stems from a conflict between insurance and incentives (Ross, 1973; 
Holmström, 1979). Agency theory generally assumes that principals are risk neutral, while agents are 
risk averse. In this context, the risk-neutral principal should bear all of the risk. However, incentive 
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issues complicate the situation. If the agent’s action cannot be observed and there is uncertainty, 
incentives must be considered. Absent uncertainty, the principal could infer from observing the result 
which action the agent had chosen and reward him accordingly. However, the result is assumed to be 
influenced by a stochastic variable. While both principal and agent know how this variable is 
distributed (and know that the other knows), the principal cannot observe the actual realization of the 
variable. He merely observes a “noisy signal” of the agent’s effort. To motivate the agent, the contract 
will specify a reward schedule: the agent’s payment from the principal is a function of the observable 
consequences. In general, such a contract will only be second best, as it will not realize the maximum 
or first-best value creation. The latter is defined as the value creation that would have arisen if the 
principal had been fully informed and could direct the agent to take the best action. The reason for the 
second-best nature of most contracts is that they give the agent incentives; this, in turn, exposes the 
agent to risk. A risk-averse agent will suffer a loss of perceived well-being (“utility”) as a 
consequence and will demand a risk premium. Agency loss can thus be measured by the risk 
premium. Reducing the agency loss is the same as reducing the risk premium. In turn, one way of 
increasing the value created in an agency relation is to reduce the risk premium. This can, for 
example, be achieved by obtaining better signals about the agent’s performance (Holmström, 1979). 
This reduces the incentives that the agent needs and, thus, the agent’s perceived risk. Agency theory 
basically predicts that value creation cannot be lifted to the first-best level. However, efficient 
incentive design and management can approximate that level.  
 Normally, the principal’s problem can be addressed in two ways: by monitoring the agent’s 
actions (observing inputs) or by using outcome-based compensation (incentive pay). By introducing 
additional information systems (such as accounting) or by extracting extra information about the 
agent’s actions in other ways, it is often possible to improve on agency relations, even though the 
additional information may be imperfect (Holmström, 1979). Applications of agency theory have 
typically considered such indicators as accounting returns, stock performance, sales growth, market 
share, and comparative performance, whereas psychological information, such as facial expressions 
and other aspects of bodily language, have not been considered. When the principal has better 
information about the actions of the agent, he no longer needs to expose the agent to such strong 
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incentives to make him chose the best action. Thus, the agent needs to shoulder less risk and will 
demand a smaller risk premium. As a result, value creation in the relation increases (i.e., the agency 
loss is reduced). However, to maximize value creation, the principal also needs to decide which 
signals related to the agent’s performance should be included in performance assessment. For 
example, is the performance of other agents a relevant signal? Can post-effort conversations with the 
agent offer additional information?   
After deciding which measures to apply, the principal needs to decide which measures and 
incentives should be linked. For example, a decision needs to be made regarding how strong 
incentives should be. Certain tasks or agents may not be well aligned with strong incentives because 
the agent’s tolerance for incentives depends on his risk aversion, or (going beyond agency theory) 
because such incentives can be detrimental to either the agent’s intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 
1985) or the special motivation that the agent may associate with working in well-functioning teams 
(Lindenberg and Foss, 2011). The principal also needs to make decisions on the intensity of 
monitoring agents. Typically, the stronger the incentives, the stronger monitoring should be. Finally, 
the principal needs to assess the extent to which multi-tasking occurs. The more the agent needs to 
multitask, the less likely it is that strong incentives will be used, as “in essence, complex jobs will 
typically not be evaluated through explicit contracts” (Prendergast, 1999: 9). (Later, we argue that this 
implies that “complex jobs” will be evaluated through mentalizing.)  
Much of agency theory is about such incentive management issues, especially: 1) strategic 
behavior on the part of agents—agents may influence the principal by offering favors or developing 
friendship ties (Tirole, 1986) or they may manipulate the signals related to their performance 
(Holmström, 1982); 2) the “rewarding A while hoping for B” (Kerr, 1975) problems that multi-
tasking may give rise to (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991); and 3) problems of subjective performance 
measurement (Bakeret al., 1994; Levin, 2003)—for example, managers may shy away from critically 
distinguishing among employees, or they may not wish to give poor ratings to subordinates whose pay 
is determined by such ratings (Murphy and Cleveland, 1991).  
Knowledge Assumptions in Agency Theory 
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 Given agency theory’s enormous influence and its contentious assumptions, a significant 
amount of literature deals critically with the theory, addressing its motivational assumptions 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Osterloh and Frey, 2000) and its performative consequences (Ferraro et 
al., 2005; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). However, although the cognitive and epistemic assumptions of 
the theory are arguably as contentious as the motivational assumptions, they have been subject to 
much less discussion, perhaps because they are less visible. These assumptions concern how 
individuals process knowledge (cognitive) and what knowledge they have (epistemic) (Goldman, 
1978).  
 Cognitive assumptions. Agency theory is sometimes interpreted as resting on foundations of 
bounded rationality (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989). In fact, however, agency theory does not assume 
bounded rationality. Rather, it assumes the “full” or “maximizing” rationality characteristic found in 
mainstream economics, where the principal and the agent can both be modeled as maximizing 
expected utility (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; see Hendry, 2002). However, work in behavioral and 
experimental economics, and in psychology suggests that individuals generally do not possess the 
cognitive apparatus needed to maximize expected utility (unless decision situations are very simple) 
(Camerer, 1998; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Simon, 1978).  
Epistemic assumptions. Agency theory makes several far-reaching assumptions regarding the 
knowledge held by the principal and agent. The theory imports the knowledge assumptions of game 
theory. One such assumption is that differences in beliefs among individuals can be completely 
explained by differences in information (Halpern, 2002). Another key knowledge assumption is that 
individuals are not only (fully) rational in the sense of being capable of maximizing expected utility, 
but that they also ascribe such rationality to others (Holler, 2001). In fact, the ascription of rationality 
takes a specific form. Player A knows that Player B is rational. Conversely, Player B knows that 
Player A is rational. Furthermore, the mutual knowledge goes on ad infinitum (“A knows that B 
knows that A knows that B knows … that X is the case”). This is the assumption of “common 
knowledge” (Lewis, 1969; Aumann, 1976), an assumption that underlies most modern game theory, 
including game-theoretical agency theory.  
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In agency theory, a number of the basic ingredients are assumed to be common knowledge in 
this sense. In the case of a moral hazard situation, such mutual knowledge includes knowledge of 
those who are involved in the relation, the actions that are available to them, the risk preferences of 
the agent, the assumption that both the principal and agent are rational, the agent’s opportunity cost, 
what the task that the principal delegates to the agent entails, and so on. Of course, the knowledge of 
the principal is not totally congruent with the agent’s, as there would not be an agency problem in 
such a case. Thus, the principal usually cannot observe the actions the agent chooses and the specific 
manifestations of uncertainty. Alternatively, he may not know the agent’s characteristics (his “type”). 
However, in all other respects the principal knows perfectly what the agent knows (and vice versa).  
Problematic Aspects of the Knowledge Assumptions in Agency Theory 
 A strong implication of the above is that a principal can perfectly read the agent’s mind with 
respect to a number of key conditions that influence the principal-agent relation (the agent can also 
perfectly read the principal’s mind with respect to these conditions, but here we focus mainly on the 
principal; see Hendry, 2002). Undoubtedly, designing and managing incentives often requires 
considerable agent-specific knowledge. Agency theory routinely assumes that the principal perfectly 
knows and understands the agent’s degree of risk aversion and his opportunity costs. Simultaneously, 
the principal cannot observe the agent’s effort. Therefore, with respect to the agent’s effort, the 
principal’s understanding is extremely imperfect. In real managerial practice, the principal can 
develop knowledge of the agent that will allow him to interpret the various behavioral clues that 
signal that agent’s effort (e.g., is the agent’s staring out of the window a signal of moral hazard or 
intense, productive thinking?). Thus, agency theory assumes—in a manner that does not seem 
empirically warranted—that the principal has a perfect theory of some parts of the agent’s mind and, 
at the same time, a highly imperfect understanding of other parts. To address this issue, in the 
following we turn towards a more realistic treatment of the principal’s knowledge by introducing the 
concept of mentalizing and linking it to agency theory.  
MENTALIZING AND RELATED CONSTRUCTS 
Putting Oneself in Others’ Shoes 
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The ability to put oneself in another person’s shoes has long been recognized as a crucial aspect 
of social interaction. In particular, this ability serves as a key mechanism for coordinating beliefs and 
actions. The importance of this ability is evident across the social sciences, including sociology 
(Schutz, 1932; Weber, 1979), and economics and game theory (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995; 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Furthermore, social psychologists and marketing scholars stress that 
perspective taking plays a significant role in negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2008) and adaptive selling 
(Dietvorst, Verbeke, Bagozzi, Yoon, Smits and Van Der Lugt, 2009).  
Given bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), individuals perceive, understand, and make sense of 
the world in terms of cognitive frames that they “impose on an information environment to give it 
form and meaning” (Walsh, 1995: 281; see Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005). The development of these cognitive 
frames is linked to specific socio-cultural and environmental contingencies. Thus, although 
individuals share many cognitive frames or “typifications” as a result of socialization (Berger and 
Luckman, 1967; Weick, 1995), those frames have important idiosyncratic and person-specific features 
(see Schütz, 1932), which produce “cognitive distance”—a difference between distinct cognitive 
schemes (Nooteboom, 2000; Nooteboom, Van Haverbeke, Duysters, Gilsing and Van Den Oord, 
2007; Wuyts, Colombo, Shantanu, and Nooteboom, 2005). In contrast, in the world of agency theory 
there can be no cognitive distance, as its existence is ruled out by the assumptions of common priors 
and common knowledge (Aumann, 1976). For real-world principals, however, cognitive distance is a 
crucially important factor.  
Defining Mentalizing  
 Recent developments in evolutionary anthropology (Call and Tomasello, 2008), cognitive 
neuroscience (Gallagher and Frith, 2003), neuro-economics (Singer and Fehr, 2005), and social 
psychology (Galinsky et al., 2008) highlight the importance of one individual’s understanding of 
another individual’s intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. When an individual makes inferences about 
such mental states, he “mentalizes” (Singer and Fehr, 2005)—he forms conjectures about mental 
states that are not directly observable but are useful because they can make sense of and predict the 
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behaviors of others. This process is particularly important for individuals’ interactions with others 
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978).  
 Intentions, knowledge, and beliefs are three distinct ingredients of human psychological—and, 
in turn, behavioral—functioning. However, a precise representation of this functioning rests on a 
simultaneous understanding of these three complementary constituents of mentalizing (Call and 
Tomasello, 2008). An understanding of intentions—plans of action that are chosen in pursuit of a goal 
(Bratman, 1989; Dennett, 1987)—represents the foundation of mentalizing. In fact, an understanding 
of intentions provides the first “interpretive matrix for deciding precisely what it is that someone is 
doing in the first place” (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll 2005: 675).  
 For example, suppose that a principal knows that an agent is working several extra hours, and 
he wants the agent to maintain this extra effort. However, the action of working extra hours may have 
widely different intentional connotations. An agent may be working extra because he is intrinsically 
motivated to deliver good performance or because he is externally motivated by the potential for a 
monetary bonus. While giving a monetary reward to the extrinsically motivated agent would be a 
proper way of encouraging that agent to keep working, giving the same reward to an intrinsically 
motivated agent would crowd out the motivation and diminish the agent’s effort (Frey and Jegen, 
2001). An understanding of the agent’s intentions is, therefore, important for the principal.  
 This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of the effects of incentives on extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation beyond the principal-agent dyad. In a situation with multiple agents, perceptions 
of injustice may arise if an agent sees other agents getting a reward that he does not receive because 
the principal infers that he is mainly intrinsically motivated. Thus, the principal’s mentalizing must 
also include how the agent compares himself socially and how he reacts to such comparisons.  
 An individual’s intentions are influenced by her knowledge. The contextualization of an 
individual’s intentions relative to an understanding of her knowledge is the second constituent of 
mentalizing. Contextualizing significantly refines the understanding of an individual’s intentions. In 
terms of the above example, if the principal knows that the agent knows that the organization has, for 
instance, just implemented a reward system, the principal may expect the agent to work harder in 
order to get a bonus (rather than because the agent has an innate interest in the task).  
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 As beliefs are, by definition, mental, the possibility of understanding someone’s beliefs 
represents “the pinnacle of mind reading” (Tomasello et al., 2005: 675; see Kaminski, Call and 
Tomasello, 2008). Moreover, the ability to explain the behavior of an actor based on what that actor 
believes to be the case remains crucial when the actor’s beliefs are wrong. In terms of the example, 
the principal believes that the agent is working extra hours because he knows about the recently 
implemented reward system. Suppose, however, that the principal also knows that the agent is 
ignorant about the output-based (as opposed to input-based) nature of the reward criterion—in other 
words, the principal knows that the agent is wrong in thinking that his extra work will automatically 
result in an increase in his compensation. The principal may or may not decide to let the agent know 
about the error in his belief.  
In sum, the principal’s ability to simultaneously discern what an agent wants to do (i.e., his 
intentions), how he regards the environment in which he operates (i.e., his knowledge), and what he 
deems probable (i.e., his beliefs and false beliefs about what will happen based on his information) are 
important parts of mentalizing. Mentalizing has been shown to form the basis for understanding how 
others make sense of their world and, in turn, for cooperative, deceptive, and empathetic behavior 
(Galinky et al., 2008; Tomasello et al., 2005).  
The Mechanisms of Mentalizing  
Mentalizing is a cognitive mechanism that involves the activation of deliberate and non-
deliberate (i.e., automatic) processes. Neuroscience research demonstrates that humans have an innate 
brain system that is dedicated to mentalizing. Specific brain regions are unconsciously and effortlessly 
activated when people engage in non-deliberate mentalizing (i.e., “implicit mentalizing,” Frith and 
Frith, 2003). However, mentalizing is not an exclusively automatic process. Other brain regions are 
activated when people deliberately engage in mentalizing processes (i.e., “explicit mentalizing,” Frith 
and Frith, 2003; see Frith and Frith, 1999; Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Given the mainly intentional 
and rational stance of classical agency theory, we take the non-deliberate and innate side of mentalizing 
as a given. In other words, we assume that principals effortlessly and automatically mentalize with 
agents to a certain extent, and we focus on the intentional and non-automatic side of mentalizing.  
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Since culture is the “webs of significance” (Geertz, 1973: 5) that give sense to the human 
experiencing of phenomena, mentalizing is intimately related to context and, more generally, to the 
cognitive distance that separates the mentalizer from the mentalizee. Clearly, the higher the cognitive 
distance, the harder mentalizing will be. For example, complex collaborative activities involving 
shared goals and socially coordinated intentions require a high degree of mutual understanding, which 
can be furthered by culturally contextualized processes (Tomasello et al., 2005), such as rituals 
(Chwe, 2001; Dacin, Munir and Tracey, 2010). Rituals are mechanisms that assist in the construction 
of shared meaning (Kunda, 1992; Meyer and Scott, 1983) by influencing how people think and make 
sense of situations (Van Maanen and Kunda, 1989). Rituals thus support mentalizing.  
Mentalizing may result in simplistic (even wrong) conjectures or in an accurate representation 
of the contents of someone else’s mind. Neuroscience research clearly indicates an individual’s 
placement between the two extreme positions of being able versus being incapable of mentalizing 
depends on whether one possesses specific, innate neural prerequisites. Consistent with this, the 
absence of mentalizing has been shown to be typical of developmental or acquired disorders such as 
autism (Baron-Choen, Leslie and Frith, 1985; Frith and Frith, 1999). However, variations along the 
accuracy dimension (i.e., the continuous scale that ranges from having an inaccurate theory to an 
accurate theory of the other’s mind) are linked to the sophistication of the aforementioned cultural and 
experiential mechanisms, and to the cognitive distance between mentalizer and mentalizee.  
Moreover, mentalizing is not immune to problems of cognitive distortion (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Thus, imperfect mentalizing reflects an inability to accurately mentalize, as well as 
overconfidence on the part of the principal, who may believe he knows things about the agent’s mind 
that he actually does not (see Flynn and Wiltermuth, 2010). To avoid overly complicating the 
argument, we abstract from the specific ways in which mentalizing may be imperfect. In addition, 
mentalizing greatly supports and combines with distinct psychological processes, such as information 
processing and memory processes. While we focus on mentalizing, we also assume that it naturally 
antecedes and concurs with other psychological processes in triggering the emergence of theories 
about others’ minds.  
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Mentalizing may be understood as a skilled behavior. In general, a skill is a “capability for a 
smooth sequence of coordinated behavior that is ordinarily effective relative to its objectives given the 
context in which it normally occurs” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 73). Thus, mentalizing has skill-like 
qualities in that it is program-like (i.e., mentalizing consists of an ordered sequence of cognitive 
steps); it is built upon a mixture of tacit and explicit knowledge (in fact, rarely is the mentalizer 
completely aware of the mechanisms that engender his having a theory of the other’s mind); and it 
requires the making of a certain number of choices, which vary in terms of the degree of intentionality 
(e.g., although the decision to mentalize may be intentional, the choice of how to proceed in order to 
mentalize may be unintentional). Like a skill, and consistent with its context-driven components, 
mentalizing can also be altered by environmental cues.  
Finally, it is important to note that all of the aforementioned factors (deliberate and non-
deliberate components of mentalizing, the importance of context and culture, potential variations in 
accuracy, and the skill-like nature of the construct) do not imply that accurate mentalizing is a remote 
possibility. On the contrary, convergent research clearly indicates that mentalizing is a fundamental 
driver of human interaction, which suggests that relatively precise degrees of mentalizing are, in fact, 
found in real-world scenarios.  
Related Constructs 
Mentalizing overlaps with two constructs that are familiar from the management research 
literature: transactive memory and perspective taking. However, mentalizing is not fully congruent 
with these concepts. Transactive memory is the shared division of cognitive labor with respect to the 
encoding, storing, retrieving, and communicating of knowledge from different but complementary 
domains (Wegner, 1986; Brandon and Hollingshead, 2004). Over time, members of a group may 
develop a common understanding of each other’s areas of competence and expertise. Transactive 
memory is the group’s members shared understanding of “who knows what” in the group (Brandon 
and Hollingshead, 2004). This type of transactive memory is similar to mentalizing in that it involves 
an understanding of what others know, but mentalizing has a much broader focus. Not only does it 
refer to the understanding of others’ knowledge but also, more importantly, to the understanding of 
their intentions and beliefs (Tomasello et al., 2005).  
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Perspective taking refers to the consideration and adoption of someone else’s psychological 
viewpoint (Davis, 1983), which activates a process of “self-other merging” (Davis, Conklin, Smith 
and Luce, 1996: 714). This process rests on the cognitive and emotional levels (Galinsky and 
Moskowitz, 2001; Galinsky and Ku, 2004). Perspective taking is similar to mentalizing, as it relates to 
the understanding of what others know, think, imagine, and feel. However, whereas perspective 
taking has both cognitive and emotional dimensions, mentalizing refers exclusively to cognitive 
theorizing about another individual’s mental states.  
Knowledge Assumptions in Agency Theory in Light of the Mentalizing Construct 
 Agency theory assumes that the principal has perfect access to and knowledge of certain mental 
states of the agent. Typically, what exactly is included under this wide-ranging knowledge assumption 
depends on the specific kind of agency model. For example, in moral hazard models, the principal 
perfectly knows the agent’s attitudes regarding risk, the actions that the agent thinks of as being 
available, the agent’s perceived opportunity costs, and so on. Of course, this is not necessarily 
intended as a descriptively accurate assumption, but as an assumption that eases mathematical 
modeling. However, in managerial practice, principals are imperfect mentalizers and mentalizing is 
not in unlimited supply. Managers/principals, like econometricians who work empirically with agency 
theory (Salanié, 2003: 462), face much “unobserved heterogeneity” with respect to the actual contents 
of agents’ minds. In turn, their mentalizing capabilities matter with regard to reward design and value 
creation.  
 In sum, we argue that to design and manage incentives, a principal needs to build a cognitive 
map of the agent’s cognitive categories and states. For reasons of mathematical tractability, agency 
theory models assume that this is unproblematic, as embodied in the assumptions of common priors 
and common knowledge. In contrast, we argue that mentalizing is imperfect and that it provides 
access to information sources that are not considered in agency theory. In the following, we address 
the principal’s mentalizing as a crucial determinant of incentive design and management (and, hence, 
value creation) in the principal-agent relation.  
CONSEQUENCES OF MENTALIZING IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONS  
Boundary Conditions and Research Model 
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 Our theorizing applies to the standard principal-agent setting of a principal and an agent, and it 
holds wherever this setting occurs, regardless of the organizational type. To facilitate exposition, we 
adopt the perspective of the principal in the sense that we address the principal’s mentalizing (and 
black box the agent’s mentalizing, see Hendry, 2002). Although cognitive, motivational, and 
emotional processes are intertwined (Cohen, 2005; Kruglanski, Shah, Friedman, Fishbach, Chun and 
Sleeth-Keppler, 2002), we follow recent research in social psychology (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2008) in 
that we separate these processes. We focus our attention on the cognitive level, and disregard any 
emphatic, emotional, or motivational processes that may accompany mentalizing. Moreover, as we 
focus on the interrelationship between mentalizing capability and value creation, we hold all other 
determinants of value creation in principal-agent relations (including the agent’s risk preferences, 
sensitivity to incentives, etc.) constant. We assume that the principal seeks to maximize value creation 
in the relationship. We do not make any specific assumptions about whether the principal lets the 
agent share in any additional value creation. Figure 1 shows how we reason from mentalizing 
capability to value creation.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
-------------------------------------- 
Learning the Agent’s Type and Managing Signals  
 We begin by examining the consistency of the mentalizing construct and key agency theory 
predictions. Agency theory shows that decreasing the level of asymmetry of information in the 
relation between principal and agent increases value creation in the relation. In other words, a better-
informed principal can better ascertain an agent’s type, reducing the need for costly signaling. 
Moreover, he is better able to infer the agent’s true effort level from the signal on the agent’s effort—
the output—and can design his incentives more precisely. This reduces the agent’s perceived risk and 
the risk premium, thereby increasing value creation.  
 Mentalizing and information asymmetry are distinct constructs. However, mentalizing can 
antecede the degree of information asymmetry in a principal-agent relationship. Specifically, 
increased mentalizing leads to a reduction in information asymmetries. In turn, this increases value 
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creation in the relation because improved mentalizing improves the principal’s understanding of the 
agent’s type and the signals related to the agent’s actions. For example, rather than relying on 
knowledge of the average characteristics of a group of agents, the principal can better ascertain 
characteristics specific to a certain agent.  
 There are a number of mechanisms through which the principal’s improved mentalizing leads 
to higher value creation. First, the principal can design a contract that better matches the specific 
agent in terms of striking the right tradeoff between providing the agent with insurance and offering 
performance incentives. Second, a principal who learns the agent’s type can better match the agent 
with specific tasks. For example, if the agent has a high degree of risk aversion, he may dislike being 
exposed to an environment in which he has to handle several tasks, as this makes it more difficult for 
the principal to reliably measure his effort (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Mentalizing is the 
psychological mechanism that provides the principal with key information about the agent—
information that agency theory assumes the principal already possesses. Thus, mentalizing serves as a 
vital mechanism for understanding real-world principal-agent relations. It may be that principals can 
gain such information through, for example, trial-and-error with different incentives, and infer agent 
characteristics from such a learning process. However, such processes are costly and lengthy, and 
mentalizing is a lower-cost alternative. This reasoning suggests the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: Mentalizing on the part of the principal is a lower-cost way of getting to know 
the agent’s risk preferences, disutility of effort and sensitivity to incentives. This knowledge 
increases value creation in the relation. 
 In addition, mentalizing can provide access to soft psychological information that is not 
considered in agency theory. For example, mentalizing may provide insight into the agent’s self-
concept orientation—whether the agent thinks of himself mainly in individualistic, relational, or 
collective terms (Cooper and Thatcher, 2010). This element matters for incentive design because it 
influences whether the agent should be offered team, rather than individual, incentives (Lindenberg 
and Foss, 2011). Because mentalizing can provide access to additional information (relative to what is 
considered in agency theory), the principal can develop a reward design that better fits the peculiar 
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characteristics of the agent. This increases value creation in the relation, as the agent’s perceived risk 
is reduced, necessitating a smaller risk premium.  
  Mentalizing also creates value because it is geared toward interpreting signals about the 
agent’s effort and trustworthiness (Singer and Fehr, 2005). Signaling helps to reduce information 
asymmetry between the two parties (Riley, 2001; Spence, 2002). This reduction depends on the 
reliability of the signal and on the receiver’s capability to correctly interpret the signal (Connelly, 
Certo, Ireland and Reutzel, 2010). Clearly, the ability to distinguish honest signals from false 
signals—and, in turn, to recognize trustworthy agents—is important for the design of efficient reward 
systems. Bonus contracts that rely on fairness and trust can, in fact, be more efficient than explicit 
incentive contracts that are enforced by the courts (Baker et al., 1994; Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007; 
Fehr and List, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2004). However, attributions of dishonesty are often 
stereotypical and inaccurate (Aavik et al., 2006). This is partially due to game playing on the side of 
the agent, who may adjust his conduct in social interactions so as to guide the impression that the 
principal forms of him (Goffman, 1990; Leary and Kowalski, 1990). The principal’s ability to 
accurately detect dishonesty and impression management on the side of the agent is linked to the 
principal’s ability to recognize and decode subtle (verbal and non-verbal) micro-expressions (Ekman 
and O’Sullivan, 1991). Given his improved understanding of the agent’s mental states, a mentalizing 
principal is clearly better equipped to decode an agent’s signals—facial gestures, body language, 
communication, etc.—as clues to his trustworthiness. Thus, mentalizing leads to better comprehension 
of the information content and the reliability of the diffuse signals on the agent’s effort and 
trustworthiness, and therefore to an improvement in monitoring (see Holmström, 1979). This means 
that the principal can better ascertain the agent’s true effort level, and, if necessary, influence him to 
increase this level. Again, principals may be capable of gaining such information by adopting various 
learning theories or by experimenting with different incentives. However, we submit that mentalizing 
is a lower-cost alternative. Thus:  
Proposition 2: Mentalizing on the part of the principal enables him to interpret subtle clues 
regarding the agent’s effort and trustworthiness at a lower cost, and improves his 
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understanding of the agent’s type and effort relative to what is posited in standard agency 
theory.  
 Rewards, punishments, and even informal encouragement or criticism are signals themselves. 
They tell the agent something about the principal, his intentions, and his attitudes (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2003). Specifically, a principal’s decision to use one reward as opposed to another (or as 
opposed to not using a formal reward) has been proven to be an extremely strong signal for the agent 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; and, outside of agency theory, Ryan and Deci, 2000). Agents’ 
receptiveness to the same signals differ. Incentives may, therefore, have a substantially different 
impact on various agents. An important issue is for the principal “to understand in what cases they 
[monetary incentives] should be used with caution” (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003: 490). Simply put, the 
principal needs to understand what a given incentive will signal to a given agent. Such an 
understanding is derived from the principal’s mentalizing, part of which originates deliberately. For 
example, if the principal is capable of mentalizing with the agent, he may understand that the agent is 
intrinsically interested in her task, and he may realize that a monetary reward may signal mistrust and, 
eventually, crowd out that agent’s motivation. In this case, the principal should choose a reward that 
signals trust or flexibility to the agent. In other words, high mentalizing allows the principal to make 
more sophisticated use of the signaling component of incentives. In particular, he can fine-tune 
signals to increase the agent’s effort. Thus: 
Proposition 3: Mentalizing on the part of the principal enables him to design incentives so that 
they convey desired signals to the agent. 
The improved ability to interpret clues about the agent’s effort and signal to the agent provide a novel 
source of value creation, as the agent’s perceived risk goes down, necessitating a smaller risk 
premium.  
Diagnosing Inefficiencies and Adjusting Incentives  
We have argued that principals that are skilled in mentalizing can learn the type of the agent, 
interpret signals about the agent’s effort, and design incentives so as to convey given signals to the 
agent (“incentive focus”). However, mentalizing principals are also capable of evaluating (ex post) the 
fit of incentives with the agent. In fact, by simply matching an understanding of the agent’s type with 
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the agent’s reactions (i.e., signals) to a given reward, the mentalizing principal can evaluate the extent 
to which that reward actually fit the agent (“incentive adjustment”) in a time- and, in turn, cost-
efficient way. Thus:  
Proposition 4: Mentalizing on the part of the principal enables him to diagnose reward 
inefficiencies at an early stage and to reduce such inefficiencies in a low-cost manner by 
redesigning rewards.  
A principal who can gain additional insight into the characteristics, intentions, and beliefs of the 
agent by mentalizing can also better utilize the incentive instruments at his disposal. For example, he 
is better positioned to judge the best combination of fixed and variable pay components in a contract 
that he offers to the agent and how to use verbal recognition as a complement to (or substitute for) 
such incentives. Also, mentalizing improves monitoring and the sending of signals to the agent, as 
argued above. Principals with more mentalizing capability will benefit more from the use of existing 
incentive instruments and vice versa. Thus, the relation between mentalizing and the principal’s extant 
portfolio of incentive instruments is characterized by complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).  
Moreover, an improved understanding of the agent’s characteristics and intentions (i.e., his 
type), and of the signaling potential of incentives increases the principal’s motivation to explore new 
incentives, to build a richer and more refined reward portfolio (“expanded incentive portfolio”), and 
to adjust existing incentive instruments so that they better fit the agents with whom the principal is 
mentalizing (“incentive refinement”). Thus, with a low level of mentalizing, the principal will tend to 
choose incentives that are “at hand” and that fit the average agent. Mentalizing improves the 
principal’s understanding of the agent’s type as well as his interpretation and sending of signals, and 
allows him to build a richer, more refined incentive portfolio by combining incentives in novel ways 
and by including new kinds of incentives. We therefore suggest:  
Proposition 5: Principals skilled in mentalizing will rely less on routine or habitual behaviors 
when choosing reward mechanisms, and they will exhibit a higher degree of creativity in their 
rewarding practices.  
Costly Mentalizing 
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Mentalizing on the part of the principal is a source of value in the principal-agent relationship. 
It is the mechanism through which soft psychological information is included in the principal’s 
assessment of the agent’s type and effort, and the signaling in which he engages. In a long-term 
relation, much mentalizing happens as a costless by-product of the main activities in the relation. 
However, we treat mentalizing as a deliberate mental act. Mentalizing requires mental effort 
(attention, information processing, etc.) that cannot be spent on other activities. Thus, mentalizing 
may have fixed costs. For example, a principal that is new to the culture of a firm in which he has 
assumed a managerial role needs to learn about the culture of that firm to ensure that he and the firm’s 
agents share some of the basic premises upon which mentalizing is built (Kunda, 1992). Similarly, 
establishing a relation with a new agent involves a certain initial investment in mentalizing with that 
agent. For instance, internship programs are used with increasing frequency by firms in order to get to 
know potential employees before deciding whether to hire them. These fixed costs of mentalizing 
suggest that principals will prefer agents who are similar in type, so that they can spread the fixed 
costs of mentalizing over many agents. There are also variable costs of mentalizing. For example, the 
principal may invest effort into interpreting a certain signal about the agent’s effort.  
Optimum mentalizing balances these costs against the benefits of mentalizing (i.e., the 
optimum is described by equality between the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of 
mentalizing). Note that there may be other benefits to learning the agent’s type and managing signals 
in addition to those that we have already identified. For example, persons low in mentalizing may 
experience greater social anxiety in interpersonal contexts. In such cases, an enhancement of 
mentalizing may reduce psychological costs. Overall, mentalizing introduces an additional tradeoff in 
the principal’s problem, and entails additional costs and benefits that need to be taken into 
consideration in understanding how value is created in principal-agent relations. From a prescriptive 
point of view, we need to identify: (a) the factors that cause value creation in such relations; (b) the 
main problems in the realization of these factors; and (c) the main instruments through which these 
problems can be averted or mitigated. Thus far, we have dealt with mentalizing capability as a factor 
that causes value creation in principal-agent relations and we have noted the costs of mentalizing. In 
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the following section, we deal in greater detail with the obstacles, represented as a cognitive distance 
construct, as well as the distinctly organizational facilitators of mentalizing capability.  
MENTALIZING AND VALUE CREATION: THE IMPACT OF COGNITIVE DISTANCE 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL SENSEMAKING  
Agency theory is “institutionally neutral” in the sense that principal-agent relations are not uniquely 
tied to specific governance structures or institutions. They can exist within as well as between firms 
(and in numerous other social arenas) (Hart, 1995). However, a significant part of principal-agent 
relations are embedded within firms (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005).  
Much research proceeds from the assumption that agency problems are endemic in 
organizations (Hart, 1995; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). At the same time, organizations encompass 
key instruments for handling these problems. Thus, established agency theory points to rewards 
coupled with performance measurement (Laffont and Martimort, 2002), tournaments (Lazear, 2000), 
and task design (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) as means to overcome agency problems. Hendry 
(2002) stresses the importance of training and instruction. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) argue that 
workers’ identities can function as important work incentives because they encompass ideals as to 
how a given job should be done, which significantly reduces principal-agent problems. Lindenberg 
and Foss (2011) point to a specific kind of social motivation that arises in team situations and argue 
that firms can succeed in mobilizing such “joint production motivation,” keeping agency problems at 
bay. 
We propose a different view of how organizational instruments can mitigate agency problems. 
Our starting point is that mentalizing capability is functional to the extent that individuals are 
cognitively distant. The higher the level of cognitive distance in a relation, the more difficult it is for a 
principal with a given level of mentalizing capability to understand the agent’s type, actions, signals, 
and so on. However, cognitive distance is a variable that can be influenced by organizational means. 
Figure 2 shows how we introduce cognitive distance and organizational instruments into our 
framework (the dotted arrows and boxes represent the main parts of Figure 1).  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
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-------------------------------------- 
Cognitive Distance and Value Creation  
By assigning attributes to the agent’s intentions, knowledge, and beliefs, the principal tries to 
understand—and eventually look at the world through—the agent’s cognitive lens. By definition, the 
construct of cognitive distance captures variability (Cannon-Bowers, and Salas, 2001; Hodgkinson 
and Healey, 2008; Nooteboom, 2000). The principal and the agent may look at the world through 
completely different (high distance) and quite similar (low distance) cognitive schemes. As 
sensemaking processes are facilitated by familiarity with the focus of attention, mentalizing is simpler 
when cognitive distance is limited. Thus, high cognitive distance between principal and agent has a 
negative impact on the accuracy of the principal’s mentalizing. As the principal’s mentalizing 
influences value creation through the mechanisms of learning the agent’s type and signaling (and the 
improved use of incentive instruments that this gives rise to, see P1 to P5), cognitive distance 
indirectly influences value creation. Specifically:  
Proposition 6: The positive effect of mentalizing on value creation in principal-agent relations 
is negatively moderated by the cognitive distance that separates principal and agent.  
Experience and Physical Proximity  
Mentalizing rests on innate and cultural bases. Whereas the former are constant, the principal’s 
experience (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), including his understanding of a cultural context (Kunda, 
1992), and his physical proximity with the agent (Gavetti, 2005) are important determinants of the 
principal’s mentalizing. Principals base their decisions on evaluations of potential alternatives that can 
(probabilistically) lead to certain consequences (March, 1994). These evaluations can be driven by 
experience or cognition. While experiential evaluations depend on actual trials of alternative options, 
cognitive evaluations depend on mental representations of reality (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2001). 
Cognitive and experiential evaluative mechanisms are closely interrelated: cognition influences 
experiential learning, while experience effects cognitive representations (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; 
Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). Consequently, we expect to see an interaction effect between cognitive 
distance and physical proximity such that the principal’s experience (negatively) moderates the 
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(negative) impact of cognitive distance on the value-creation implications of the principal’s 
mentalizing.  
In addition, a principal’s mentalizing depends on his physical positioning relative to the agent. 
Consistent with the idea that rationality is bounded and situated (Simon, 1955; Dearborn and Simon, 
1958), there is evidence that important signals of human behavior can be perceived only by direct 
observation of specific verbal and non-verbal micro-expressions (Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991). This 
suggests that given a fixed cognitive distance between principal and agent, physical proximity 
between the parties eases the principal’s bridging of that distance. Physical proximity allows the 
principal to grasp additional aspects of the agent’s behavior, which leads to the making of more 
accurate attributions. Thus, like the principal’s experience, physical proximity (negatively) influences 
the (negative) impact of cognitive distance on the contribution to value creation of mentalizing (i.e., 
P6):  
Proposition 7: The negative effect of cognitive distance on the value creation arising from 
mentalizing is negatively moderated by the principal’s experience and physical proximity to the 
agent.  
The Role of Organizational Sensemaking Instruments in Bridging Cognitive Distance 
Evolutionary anthropologists argue that humans have been equipped by evolution to 
spontaneously recognize joint endeavors and see themselves as part of such endeavors. This involves 
definitions of roles and responsibilities, and cognitions about the relevant tasks, interdependencies, 
timing, and possible obstacles to coordination in the joint endeavor (Tomasello et al., 2005; Higgins 
and Pittman, 2008). Lindenberg and Foss (2011) argue that organizations need to nurture, mobilize, 
and sustain these innate, but latent, capacities for coordination if they are to overcome the cognitive 
distance that is inevitably produced by the organizational division of labor, as well as implications for 
ingroup/outgroup dynamics (Brewer, 1991), and organizational roles and their emotional and 
cognitive correlates. The tension between the organizational division of labor and shared cognition is 
generally recognized in organization theory, and many researchers emphasize the role of the 
organization in shaping members’ beliefs, and, in effect, reducing cognitive distance (Kogut and 
Zander, 1996; Lindenberg and Foss, 2011; Weick, 1995; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Witt, 1998).  
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Research on organizational identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Brewer and Gardner, 1996; 
Brickson, 2005, 2007; Dutton, Roberts and Bednar, 2010; Kogut and Zander, 1996) focuses directly 
on how the formation of identity is intertwined with cognitive homogenization processes. The sharing 
of cognition that organizational identity supports may mean that “procedural rules are learned, and 
coordination and communication are facilitated across individuals and groups of diverse specialized 
competence” (Kogut and Zander, 1996: 502). An emerging stream of literature deals with shared 
cognition in teams (e.g., Mohammed and Dumville, 2001). In this regard, an important goal of 
effective team design is to assist in the sharing of cognitions (Hirschfeld, Jordan, Feild, Giles, and 
Armenakis, 2006; Priem, Harrison and Muir, 1995). Mathieu and Rapp (2009) argue that clarification 
regarding individual roles in the team and how roles are interrelated is a particularly important aspect 
of team design, as are clear performance objectives, task coordination, and contingency plans for task 
execution. De Dreu (2007) shows that the more team members understand the interdependencies in 
the team, the more they engage in helping behaviors and learning, and the higher their productivity. 
Apparently, clearly defining and communicating task interdependencies contributes to overcoming 
cognitive distance because it contributes to task reflexivity, that is, “the extent to which team 
members overtly reflect upon the group’s objectives, strategies, and processes and adapt them to 
current or anticipated endogenous or environmental circumstances” (West, 1996: 559). This includes 
more than the sharing of cognitions or mental models (or “reducing information asymmetry”), as 
successful adaptation at the group level also requires “cross understanding” (Huber and Lewis, 2010) 
in which group members understand how they differ in terms of knowledge, roles, and so on, and how 
such differences must be taken into account when adapting to change.  
On the organizational level, the sharing of cognitions and even task reflexivity can be supported 
by multiple means. A clear vision and mission statement that focus on a common purpose and are 
consensually supported by top management support the sharing of cognitions (Ashforth and Johnson, 
2001). The same is true of organizational rituals (Dacin, Munir and Tracey, 2010). Chwe (2001) 
argues that a key purpose of rituals is to support the formation of epistemic conditions that 
approximate the common knowledge conditions of game theory. Thus, organizational members who 
participate in rituals and who know that other organizational members participate know that all 
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participants share the knowledge that was communicated at the ritual. Task reflexivity, which is 
cognitively more demanding than shared cognition, may be assisted by job rotation and cross-training, 
as these practices make employees familiar with other functions, roles, activities, and so on, and help 
them to understand how these contribute to firm goals. In summary: 
Proposition 8: Organizational identity, transparent team and task design, and the 
communication of shared beliefs reinforce the value-creation potential of mentalizing by 
reducing the cognitive distance between principals and agents.   
While organizations can be designed to reduce cognitive distance between principals and agents, 
complete elimination of such distance may not be desirable for reasons of variety generation (Walsh, 
1995).  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
We have argued that mentalizing is a fundamental determinant of value creation in principal-agent 
relations. Specifically, we have suggested that mentalizing represents one way in which a principal 
improves his knowledge of the agent’s characteristics and efforts, as it allows him to access the kind 
of soft psychological information that is not considered in standard agency theory. As a result, 
incentive instruments can be better tailored to agents and principals can be more creative in their use 
of the incentive instruments that are at hand. Mentalizing thus represents a source of value creation in 
principal-agent relations beyond those considered in agency theory. 
Our analysis proceeded through four different stages. First, we reviewed and problematized 
(Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011) the cognitive and epistemic assumptions of agency theory. Second, 
we conceptualized the mentalizing construct. Third, focusing on the context of a simple principal-
agent relationship, we showed that the principal’s mentalizing leads to an improved understanding of 
the agent's type and signaling, and in turn to higher value creation in the relation. Finally, we showed 
that the value creation potential of mentalizing is moderated by the cognitive distance that separates 
principal and agent. We discussed individual- and organization-level factors that can be used to 
reduce cognitive distance and moderate its impact on the value-creation consequences of mentalizing. 
In this section, we close by discussing our model’s contributions, practical implications, and desirable 
future developments.  
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Contribution to Theory  
 This paper contributes to management research in a number of ways. First, it explicitly 
introduces the notion of mentalizing into agency theory. Agency theory implicitly makes assumptions 
about mentalizing, but unrealistically assumes that mentalizing is perfect with respect to certain 
parameters and variables (e.g., the agent’s risk preferences) and highly imperfect with respect to other 
variables (e.g., the agent’s effort). We introduce a more realistic notion of mentalizing as generally 
imperfect but given to improvements (Bagozzi, Verbeke, Berg, Rietdijk, Dietvorst, and Worm, in 
press).  
 Second, we show that integrating these constructs with agency theory enriches the theory, 
leading to an improved understanding of the sources of value creation in principal-agent relations. 
Thus, a principal that is skilled at mentalizing can better learn the type of the agent, read the signals 
related to the agent’s effort, and signal to the agent. Mentalizing thus allows for a fuller understanding 
of subjective performance assessment (Baker et al., 2004) and relates relational signaling (Lindenberg 
and Foss, 2011) to agency theory. Mentalizing creates value because it results in better estimates of 
the agent’s effort and type, and eases the matching of agents with contracts. It also leads to greater 
creativity in contract design. Agents will prefer principals that are more skilled at mentalizing to 
principals that are less skilled because the mentalizing of the former leads to more value creation and, 
hence, a bigger “value pie” that can be shared by the principal and the agent.  
 A third contribution is the placement of agency theory into an explicit organizational context. 
Recent research emphasizes the importance of recognizing the institutional contexts in which 
principal-agent relations take place (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin et al., 2007). Specifically, 
the incorporation of an institutional perspective into agency theory is expected to improve our 
understanding of agency problems and, in turn, to allow for more accurate predictions (Wiseman, 
Cuevas-Rodríguez, and Gomez-Mejia, in press). We show that when organizational sensemaking 
instruments reduce the cognitive distance between principal and agent, the value-creation potential of 
the principal-agent relation is higher (given a fixed degree of mentalizing capability). In so doing, we 
implicitly confirm that the explanatory power of agency theory may be leveraged by placing the 
theory in specific organizational contexts.  
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 Before we turn to a discussion of potential avenues for future research, we note that, to some 
extent, the principal’s needs for mentalizing and agent-specific information are mitigated by self-
selection and signaling on the part of the agent. Self-selection means that there is an endogenous 
matching of agents and contracts to the extent that agents choose offered contracts on the basis of 
their (unobserved) heterogeneity (Lazear, 2000). Agent signaling means that the agent can convey 
credible information about such factors as his ability to the principal. However, while self-selection 
and signaling make life easier for the principal, they do not eliminate the need for mentalizing. Even 
well-developed reward systems with a high degree of automation leave considerable room for 
judgment on the part of the principal regarding the interpretation of concrete signals on agent 
performance (Baker et al., 1994). Such judgments may be based on mentalizing. With respect to 
signaling, signals are often very coarse (e.g., education, grades, job history). The fact that firms 
conduct complicated hiring processes with multiple face-to-face interview rounds testifies to the fact 
that signaling is not a complete substitute for mentalizing. Thus, firms (principals) need to not only 
learn the type of an agent but also understand agent-specific characteristics. This requires mentalizing.  
Future Research  
 The introduction into agency theory of cognitive and epistemic assumptions that are more in 
accord with the traditional emphasis on bounded rationality in management theory is an ambitious 
target toward which this paper makes but a first step. Our contribution to current theory can be further 
elaborated and extended in several ways. Specifically, we envision eight attractive avenues for future 
research.  
 The mentalizing construct and its antecedents. Mentalizing has been researched in 
evolutionary anthropology (Call and Tomasello, 2008), neuroscience (Gallagher and Frith, 2003), 
neuro-economics (Singer and Fehr, 2005), and psychology (Galinsky et al., 2008). We have 
conceptualized it in a managerial context, but we have provided a highly abstract treatment in the 
specific context of the agency relation. However, as monitoring (in a broad sense) employees only 
constitutes a subset of a manager’s activities, it seems promising to extend mentalizing to other 
managerial activities, such as coordination (Heath and Staudenmeyer, 2000) and leadership. A useful 
avenue for future research would be to investigate what, specifically, may antecede intentional 
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mentalizing in a managerial context. In other words, are there any organizational factors that may 
actually trigger the deliberate mentalizing potential of a low-mentalizing principal?  
 The agent’s mentalizing. To keep our analysis manageable, we have made several simplifying 
assumptions. One such assumption is that we only need to consider the principal’s mentalizing. 
Although we have “frozen” the agent’s mentalizing, mentalizing is clearly an interactive process 
involving both principal and agent. The question is whether taking the agent’s mentalizing into 
account will change our conclusions. On the one hand, a mentalizing agent will better understand that 
a mentalizing principal seeks to improve his understanding of the agent’s characteristics, effort, and 
so on to the benefit of both. Given such reasoning, our conclusions should be strengthened by 
including the agent’s mentalizing. On the other hand, it may be that agents who are high in 
mentalizing relative to principals may better game incentive systems to their own advantage (Tirole, 
1986). This would complicate our reasoning because it would suggest that the agent’s mentalizing 
may be value destroying. However, to the extent that principal-agent relationships are placed in 
competitive conditions, value-destroying relationships are not viable and the sorting process will 
match agents and principals that are high in mentalizing.   
 Empathy. Recent evidence from social psychology depicts the capacities to cognitively 
understand others’ point of view and to emotionally connect with others as “related but distinct social 
competencies” (Galinsky et al., 2008: 378). This paper focuses only on the perspective-taking (i.e., 
cognitive) dimension of empathy. However, cognition, emotion, and motivation tend to be intertwined 
in human behavior (Cohen, 2005; Kruglanski et al., 2002). We did not freeze motivation per se; for 
instance, we considered the agent’s motivation as key to value creation and, therefore, as a crucial 
target of the principal’s mentalizing. Rather, we controlled for the possibility that the principal’s 
mentalizing may trigger affective and emotional behaviors in the principal himself. In other words, a 
precise theory of the agent’s mind might engender emotional and affective reactions in the principal 
that could, in turn, substantially condition the principal-agent interaction. For example, a principal 
who is high in mentalizing may recognize that an agent is misbehaving because of honest 
incompetence rather than for self-seeking reasons (Hendry, 2002). Such a principal may feel 
sympathy for the (incompetent) agent and decide not to use the intended sanctions. Consistent with 
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Galinsky et al.’s (2008) analysis of the impact of empathy in negotiations, it could be argued that the 
emergence of strong affective and emotional feelings linked to enhanced mentalizing on the side of 
the principal likely influences value creation in the principal-agent relation. The effects may be 
negative or positive, as increased mentalizing may foster antipathy or sympathy, and both may have 
negative as well as positive consequences for value creation depending on the concrete situation.  
 Principal and agent characteristics. Principals and agents differ on multiple dimensions. To 
simplify the exposition, we only focused on the principal’s experience and proximity to the agent. 
However, principals—not least in their capacities as managers—also differ on dimensions such as 
attitudes, information-processing styles, and leadership styles, characteristics that seem to be good 
candidates for additional moderators for the models depicted in Figures 1 and 2. For example, 
information-processing styles may moderate the relation between mentalizing capability and type 
learning postulated in Proposition 1. Similarly, agent characteristics need to be introduced more fully 
in our theorizing. A starting point may be to consider the agent’s experience as a potential moderator 
between mentalizing and type learning. For instance, experienced agents may be better at recognizing 
and preventing the principal’s mentalizing by means of impression management. Thus, the agent’s 
experience may (negatively) moderate the impact of the principal’s mentalizing on his understanding 
of the agent’s type.  
 Variability. Although we place principal-agent relations in an organizational context, we do not 
discuss them in the context of an environment. Nevertheless, environments differ widely (Dess and 
Rasheed, 1991) and in ways that could matter to the reasoning in this paper. For example, mentalizing 
in fast-moving industries may be different from mentalizing in slower-moving industries. Relatedly, 
the extent to which the firm confronts many different environments (e.g., national firms versus 
multinational corporations) matters for mentalizing. One important reason why the environment 
matters is that different environments typically involve agents with different characteristics. Human 
resource management scholars use the construct of the “human resource pool” (Lepak and Snell, 
1999). In analogy to this, firms confront “agent pools.” These may be dimensionalized in terms of 
size, heterogeneity, and turnover. As firms differ widely in size, the size of their agent pools also 
differs widely. National firms typically confront less heterogeneous agent pools than multinational 
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firms. Firms in dynamic environments typically experience greater turnover than firms in less 
dynamic environments (Haveman, 1995). It may be hypothesized that mentalizing is more complex 
and costly (and its effects are weaker) when the number of agents is high, agents are heterogeneous, 
and the relation between principal and agent(s) is characterized by high turnaround. Specifically, in 
terms of the model in Figure 2, the number, heterogeneity, and turnover of the agent pool negatively 
moderate the (negative) effect of organizational sensemaking instruments on cognitive distance (i.e., 
Proposition 8).   
 Performance implications. Much interest has recently been devoted to understanding the 
micro-foundations of organizational performance in terms of both motivational (Gottschalg and Zollo, 
2007; Lindenberg and Foss, 2011) and cognitive micro-foundations (Gavetti, 2005; Gavetti and 
Rivkin, 2007). A concern with micro-foundations naturally involves human resources, which are 
perhaps the “key ingredient to organizational success and failure” (Baron and Kreps, 1999: 4). The 
contribution to value creation made by human resources is, among things, dependent on their 
motivation. In this paper, we have addressed how factors related to knowledge and rationality 
influence the provision of incentives and, hence, the motivation of agents. We have identified three 
factors that influence value creation related to human resources: mentalizing, cognitive distance, and 
organizational sensemaking instruments. Mentalizing may be treated as resource in the sense of the 
resource-based view (Barney, 1991). Mentalizing, in fact, may give rise to rents when it yields 
improvements in value creation (net the costs required to obtain that increase) that exceed those of the 
competition. The costliness of imitating these rents may make rents sustainable.  
 Mentalizing and “envy costs.” While one strength of mentalizing is that it allows for the design 
of fine-grained, agent-specific incentives (see Propositions 1 to 5), the implementation of 
“customized” incentives may raise issues of fairness and consistency in organizations. Although the 
aim of mentalizing is to improve the measurement of input performance, and thus contribute to a 
better alignment of efforts and rewards, it is possible that the increased differentiation brought about 
by mentalizing may lead to perceptions of inequity and even envy among organizational members 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2008). Perceived inequity relative to relevant social referents may drive 
attempts to restore equity in ways that are harmful to the organization (e.g., refusing to cooperate with 
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those referents who have been “privileged”; Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger, 2003). Such “envy 
costs” need to be balanced against the benefits of mentalizing in a fuller, more realistic model of the 
costs and benefits of mentalizing.  
 Empirical work. Future research may also include empirical work on the ideas proposed here 
so as to gather additional “empirical detail about how principals and agents actually choreograph their 
dance” (Shapiro, 2005: 283). With the aid of increasingly sophisticated instruments and 
multidisciplinary techniques, researchers are developing scales for measuring individuals’ capabilities 
to mentalize (Dietvorst et al., 2009). This makes it possible, in principle, to test our research model 
and propositions. However, given that empirical research on mentalizing in the context of principal-
agent relations and in the organizational context is virtually non-existent, a multi-methodology 
approach that relies on interview, in-depth observational, and experimental methods seems preferable.  
Formal Work. Economic models are deliberately kept simple for the purpose of mathematical 
treatment. One could fear that taking mentalizing into account in the way we have proposed may 
make models intractable or, at least, non-parsimonious. However, economists are busy building 
tractable and parsimonious models of bounded rationality (e.g., Rubinstein, 1998; Mullainathan, 
2002). Moreover, the outcomes of substituting the current unrealistic cognitive and epistemic 
assumptions of agency theory with more realistic ones ultimately need to be examined in the context 
of formal models that allow for greater stringency than verbal logic.  
A first stab at such a formalization could be to add a variable, say ”m,” that refers to the 
mentalizing ability of the principal (and, potentially, a second one for the agent’s mentalizing ability). 
This variable, which would vary between 0 and 1 (0 = no mentalizing ability; 1 = full ability, i.e., the 
classical agency case), would then also show up in, for example, the formula for the optimal incentive 
intensity (Holmström, 1979), beta. Less than perfect mentalizing (i.e., m < 1) would lower the optimal 
beta, as it is more likely that the variable component of the remuneration is inappropriate given the 
agent’s characteristics. Similar results could be derived for optimal monitoring intensity.  
Coda 
In recent decades, agency theory has become an important source theory in management. At the 
same time, the world has become increasingly globalized, the average tenure of employees has been 
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significantly reduced, environments have become increasingly dynamic and unpredictable, and firms 
have increasingly made use of fleeting forms of organization and relations. These developments cast 
doubt on a fundamental assumption in principal-agency theory—that the principal can (in certain 
crucial respects) perfectly mind-read the agent.  
In this paper, we have examined the consequences of making more realistic assumptions with 
respect to the principal’s mentalizing, and we have shown how this leads to a richer, more 
managerially relevant theory of value creation in principal-agent relations. We believe that an 
understanding of the role played by the human potential for interpersonal sensemaking will not only 
enrich the explanatory potential of the theory, but also provide managers with refined guidance for 
value maximization. We trust that the analysis presented here will encourage future explorations of 
this new, important path towards understanding value creation in economic relations.  
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